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Abstract. Animal ethics—the field of philosophy concerned with the moral status of animals—is 2 
experiencing a momentum unprecedented in its history. Surprisingly, animal behavior science 3 
remains on the sidelines, despite producing critical evidence on which many arguments in animal 4 
ethics rest. Here we explore the origins of the divide between animal behavior science and 5 
animal ethics, before considering whether behavioral scientists should concern themselves with 6 
it. We finally envision tangible steps that could be taken to bridge the gap, encouraging scientists 7 
to be aware of, and to more actively engage with, an ethical revolution that is partly fueled by the 8 
evidence they generate. 9 
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              The moral status of animals is a longstanding question dating back at least to Aristotelian 12 
philosophy (see Regan & Singer, 1989 for an overview of historical and contemporary writings 13 
on the topic). However, it has been brought into especially acute focus in recent decades. The 14 
modern development of the animal ethics debate is fueled by many factors—among them, novel 15 
scientific insights into the complexities of animal minds and emotions (Bekoff & Pierce, 2017); 16 
the ever-increasing scale of industrial farming (Harrison, 2013/1964); and the Anthropocene, an 17 
era heralded by unprecedented human-induced changes to the earth’s climate, environments, and 18 
resident wildlife (Ceballos et al., 2015). The cumulative impact of these trends has raised the 19 
urgency of moral concerns over the nature of human-animal relationships, particularly in the 20 
context of our use, overuse, and misuse of animals. The exploitation of animals for food and 21 
other products represents just part of the prevailing narrative: a major shift is taking place in how 22 
people view the role of animals in research, entertainment, and even companionship. This turn 23 
was detectable in early publications like Ryder's (1975) Victims of Science and Singer's (1975) 24 
seminal Animal Liberation, and later built upon by those of other scholars (e.g., Donaldson & 25 
Kymlicka, 2011; Francione, 1995; Jamieson, 2002; Korsgaard, 2018; Nussbaum, 2018; Regan, 26 
1983; Rollin, 1992; see also Armstrong & Botzler, 2017 for a comprehensive anthology of 27 
readings on animal ethics). The last two decades have witnessed an exponential increase in 28 
literature and journals focusing on animal ethics—the field of philosophy concerned with the 29 
moral status of animals (Figure 1).   30 
This transition in ethical thinking about animals has been, at least in part, driven forward 31 
by evolutionary theory and discoveries made in the behavioral sciences. Darwin’s theory of 32 
evolution by natural selection offered a new and powerful challenge to the anthropocentric 33 
assumption that humans are the pinnacle of creation—an assumption central to many historically 34 
and presently influential theological conceptions of the world (Rachels, 1990). As the earlier 35 
scientific revolution guiding human understanding of the natural order showed that the earth is 36 
not the center of the cosmos, this revolution more dramatically levelled human ontological status 37 
by insisting that humans are one of a countless variety of other animals. The disintegration of our 38 
pre-Darwinian understanding of nature, coupled today with the extent of anthropogenic changes 39 
faced by the environment and animals in the industrial world, has revealed deep-seated 40 
incompatibilities between dominant frameworks of value (still rooted in a pervasive sense of 41 
human superiority) and the current state of knowledge regarding the capacities of other species 42 
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and their vulnerability to human actions (e.g., Bekoff & Pierce, 2017; Jones, 2013; Rachels, 43 
1990).  44 
Recent progress in scientific research on animal behavior has provided evidence used by 45 
animal ethics by documenting previously unknown aspects of animal life that have fundamental 46 
ethical implications. Studies on the cognitive, emotional, and social capacities of other species 47 
have discredited long-held assumptions about capacities thought to be unique to humans. Non-48 
exclusively, this list includes the design and use of tools (Sanz, Call, & Boesch, 2013); the 49 
prevalence of animal cultures (Laland & Bennett, 2009) and the capacity to innovate (Reader, 50 
Morand-Ferron, & Flynn, 2016); the complexity and efficiency of animal vocal communication, 51 
including symbolic communication (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980) and forms of 52 
protosyntaxes (Ouattara, Lemasson, & Zuberbühler, 2009); the capacity for self-awareness 53 
(Gallup, Anderson, & Shillito, 2002), mental time-travel (Raby, Alexis, Dickinson, & Clayton, 54 
2007), and a wide range of emotional experiences, including joy and grief (de Waal, 2019); 55 
reports of complex forms of consciousness such as empathy (de Waal & Preston, 2017), and of 56 
social intelligence such as the formation of reciprocal alliances and the active management of 57 
long-term social relationships (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007), systems of conflict resolution (Aureli 58 
& de Waal, 2000), and the ability to impute mental states to others (Call & Tomasello, 2008), 59 
including the strategic adjustment of one’s own knowledge of what others know (Emery & 60 
Clayton, 2001). These findings have all blurred traditional divisions structuring historical 61 
discussions of human uniqueness—including the opposition between nature and culture, between 62 
animal objects and human subjects, and between instinctive and rational actions—consequently 63 
casting doubt on the anthropocentrism that has largely dominated the history of ethics as a field 64 
of philosophical inquiry.  65 
Alternative systems of ethical values developed in contemporary animal ethics often rely 66 
on empirical evidence to demonstrate the possession (or lack thereof) by a non-human individual 67 
of the relevant attribute conferring moral consideration (Allen, 2006). The main theories in 68 
animal ethics are pathocentric (i.e., centered on sentience and the capacity to suffer) and 69 
therefore hinge on empirical knowledge documenting the sentience of animals—such as recent 70 
work demonstrating that fish feel pain (Brown, 2015). In addition, perceptions of animals as 71 
“subjects-of-a-life” are central to the deontological approach to animal ethics developed by Tom 72 
Regan that has also formed a critical part of the legal case for animal rights (Regan, 1983). 73 
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Studies revealing the existence of personalities (Sih, Bell, & Johnson, 2004), episodic memory 74 
(Clayton, Griffiths, Emery, & Dickinson, 2001), intentionality (Allen & Bekoff, 1995), and 75 
rationality (Hurley & Nudds, 2006) have thus been instrumental in revealing that animals have a 76 
subjective life, personal history, interests, and goal-oriented agency (Jones, 2013). Taken 77 
together, this constellation of results from scientific research on animals has paved the way to 78 
changed (and changing) perspectives on the moral status of animals.  79 
Despite these critical contributions to animal ethics, animal behavior sciences like 80 
ethology, behavioral ecology, and comparative psychology have played a rather passive role in 81 
the progression and expansion of this movement. In other words, though animal behavior 82 
scientists’ work has been integral, it is non-scientists who have primarily pioneered the 83 
integration of science and ethics. Here, we advance the argument that if the ethics of human-84 
animal relationships are to be redefined, then more active participation on the part of animal 85 
behavior scientists has great potential—not just for moving animal ethics debates forward, but 86 
for scientists themselves. To be clear, in attempting to bridge the study of animal behavior and 87 
animal ethics, we are not just referring to the ethics of using animals in behavioral sciences—88 
which have already been the focus of thorough reviews (see Text Box 1). Further, although the 89 
scientific literature has recently highlighted how animal behavioral sciences can inform animal 90 
conservation (e.g., Caro, 2007; Greggor et al., 2016) and animal welfare science (e.g., Dawkins, 91 
2006; Fraser, 1999), it has not yet extended to engage with the full realm of issues debated in 92 
animal ethics, which include questions about the fundamental ground of moral status. Our 93 
primary purpose in this article is to make that extension by addressing three key questions: What 94 
are the primary reasons for a gap between animal behavior science and animal ethics? Should 95 
behavioral scientists feel concerned about this growing disconnect? And how could they more 96 
actively contribute to the development of animal ethics?  97 
 98 
Why the gap? 99 
A primary reason for a frequent lack of communication between animal ethicists and behavioral 100 
scientists may reflect traditional difficulties in crossing disciplinary boundaries. Contemporary 101 
scientific culture remains largely disconnected from philosophy, which—unfortunately in our 102 
view—is not part of the regular academic training received by scientists; as a result, scientists 103 
may not be motivated or prepared to engage in broad ethical discussions that directly pertain to 104 
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their scientific practice or results. The persistence of a gap is exacerbated institutionally by a lack 105 
of educational and career development opportunities that cross-over between behavioral science 106 
and philosophy. But it is also caused by fundamentally different theoretical and methodological 107 
orientations. Science aims to discover causal relationships between states of affairs and 108 
phenomena in the physical world, while ethics is an explicitly value-laden, normative field of 109 
inquiry that aims to defend our best judgments as to what we ought to do. We are not here 110 
proposing a solution to the “fact/value” relationship or to the problem of whether there are 111 
normative facts and how they might “fit” into nature, but rather proposing that differences in the 112 
basic questions and methods of scientists and ethicists underlie a prevalent, but divisive attitude 113 
that science is rigorous and “objective” while ethical theorizing is more “subjective.” 114 
Acquainting scientists with rigorous debate in normative ethics and ethical theory, as well as 115 
pointing them to the ways in which scientific research can be enmeshed within the values of the 116 
particular times and places in which it is carried out (Kincaid, Dupré, & Wylie, 2007), may help 117 
emphasize the benefits of interdisciplinary dialogue and research into the complex historical and 118 
logical relationship between science and ethics. Greater awareness of the various conceptual and 119 
normative assumptions that may come along with different conceptual frameworks can only 120 
improve the quality of scientific thinking (Laplane et al., 2019). 121 
While scientists should all be aware of the spectrum of ethical discussions related to their 122 
daily scientific practice, they may sometimes fail to see that animal ethics is a broad and fast-123 
growing area of philosophical inquiry and normative debate concerning the nature of human-124 
animal relationships that is built on rational argumentation. It is important to realize that 125 
philosophers working on animal ethics may adopt a diversity of nuanced positions, and do not 126 
uniformly defend specific political or policy agendas. Scientists may sometimes lump the term 127 
“animal ethics” with other domains, in particular with the set of ethical regulations that rule their 128 
research activities (Text Box 1); with the emergence of animal welfare or conservation as 129 
scientific fields using research to assess and improve the animal condition; or even with the 130 
activism incited by animal rights associations. Conversely, while ethicists may be more aware of 131 
scientists’ work than the reverse, they may not be up-to-date with the most current research and 132 
debates in the field. Nor do ethicists necessarily have experience rigorously observing animal 133 
behavior. Disciplinary segregations between animal welfare scientists, conservation biologists, 134 
and (some) animal ethicists are particularly telling examples of the oddity that the divide 135 
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between these so-called “two cultures” persists even in the context of obviously shared ethical 136 
concerns (Fraser, 1999). While the integration of normative and empirical approaches to animal 137 
welfare and conservation sciences have eventually gained advocates (i.e., welfare: Dawkins, 138 
2006; Fraser, 1999; Würbel, 2009; conservation: Ramp & Bekoff, 2015), scientific discussions 139 
of ethical issues have focused on a rather specific set of questions with limited attention to 140 
foundational reflection on ethical frameworks and on how normative and empirical approaches 141 
relate (Dawkins, 2006).  142 
The gap between ethicists and behavioral scientists has further been maintained by 143 
mutual defiance and skepticism. If and how animals should be used in science has been a core                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       144 
question of animal ethics since its inception, and behavioral research has immediately been the 145 
focus of severe criticism for conducting painful and unnecessary experiments (Ryder, 1975; 146 
Singer, 1975). Ethicists subsequently became suspicious towards, or dismissive of, any scientific 147 
procedure involving animals to study their behavior (Fraser, 1999). Meanwhile, animal behavior 148 
scientists naturally feared condemnation surrounding their research, and may have perceived the 149 
gradual development of ethical regulations on the use of animals in research (Text Box 1) as an 150 
extra source of constraints and bureaucracy in their work. This divide has likely been furthered 151 
by several aspects of the predominant disciplinary culture of animal behavior. Many animal 152 
behavior researchers have traditionally adopted the attitude of stifling empathy towards their 153 
study subjects in the interest of preserving scientific objectivity and avoiding behavioral 154 
interferences with the study subject (Kennedy, 1992). Such detachment in the name of 155 
objectivity may have contributed to the notion that an ethical sensibility towards subjects of 156 
research is “unscientific” and “subjective,” and may still prevent many researchers from 157 
perceiving open engagement with current debates in animal ethics as an integral part of, or at 158 
least as compatible with, scientific thinking and practice.  159 
New points of tension have arisen in the course of contemporary discussions in animal 160 
ethics, which have for the most part been dominated by two competing approaches: utilitarian 161 
welfare-based and deontological rights-based approaches. Whereas both approaches share the 162 
idea that animal welfare is worthy of protection for its own sake and not for the sake of humans, 163 
the welfare approach insists that moral duties related to the humane treatment of animals come 164 
from animals’ capacity to feel pain and pleasure. It stems from a utilitarian and consequentialist 165 
approach to animal ethics, according to which the aggregate benefits of any intervention into 166 
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animal lives must exceed any harmful costs (Singer, 1975). In contrast, theories of animal rights 167 
are based in deontological ethics, pursuant to which duties to animals come from the respect that 168 
they deserve as agents with their own unique interests, aims, and goals. Theorists in this school 169 
consider animals’ lives to be intrinsically valuable and propose to grant them basic rights—such 170 
as the right to life, freedom, and not to be tortured—to prevent them from being treated as “mere 171 
means” such that their interests are sacrificed to human interests (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; 172 
Francione, 1995; Regan, 1983). This generates a critical tension with welfare approaches, 173 
according to which animals retain an instrumental value in situations in which benefits (to the 174 
human community) might outweigh harm (to the animals). It is clear that when animal scientists 175 
do engage with ethical debates, the prevailing utilitarian, welfare-based approach is often 176 
adopted by default, probably due—at least in part—to the use of animals in scientific research. 177 
However, many ethicists have instead favored theories of animal rights (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 178 
2011), though they have not uniformly condemned the use of animals in research within this 179 
framework. Thus, although the practical implications of such divergences in underlying ethical 180 
theory may be profound, rights-based theories do not necessarily exclude the possibility of 181 
research on animals. For example, just as human volunteers can participate in scientific 182 
experiments, it may be possible to envision a research protocol that respects the dissent of a non-183 
human subject (e.g., Fenton, 2014), especially in behavioral research where experiments can be 184 
designed in which animals are free to participate.  185 
 186 
Should animal behavior scientists concern themselves with animal ethics? 187 
A greater integration between animal ethics and the animal behavior scientific community is 188 
desirable for ethical and pragmatic reasons. Foremost, there is an ethical reason in that scientists 189 
fulfill a social responsibility when they engage with and help others understand ethical 190 
implications of research. Yet there are also pragmatic benefits for science, including helping 191 
scientists examine sources of historical and cultural bias that may limit scientific questions and 192 
approaches, and so further enrich and broaden scientific understanding. Some of these benefits 193 
may admittedly arise from interactions with philosophical discussions about the nature of 194 
animals that are broader than animal ethics, for example philosophical work on animal minds, 195 
perception and representation, social learning and culture, altruism and cooperation, and 196 
rationality (Andrews, 2015; Andrews & Beck, 2018). Nonetheless, the recent renewal of the 197 
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philosophy of animals as a sub-field within the philosophy of science has played and continues 198 
to play a major role in the expansion of animal ethics insofar as it has also challenged 199 
anthropocentric approaches that have dominated classical philosophy. While the recognition of 200 
animal consciousness and subjectivity is growing, it is not unanimous in philosophy (cf 201 
Carruthers, 2000 and Tye, 2016, for instance). These important debates that are relevant to 202 
animal ethics, but are also broader, draw on and require science and should, therefore, be 203 
inspiring to animal scientists as well. 204 
 205 
Filling our social responsibility. Many scientists are naturally interested in how their results 206 
inform and inspire societal debates—one obvious reason for animal behavioral scientists to 207 
engage with the literature on animal ethics. In addition to this natural curiosity, and despite 208 
commonly holding the view that scientific findings have no intrinsic normative value, scientists 209 
still usually support ideas of moral progress that follow from scientific progress in our rational 210 
understanding of the natural world. For example, where progress in understanding the neurologic 211 
development of infants uncovered the capacity for pain (Anand & Hickey, 1987), it became an 212 
ethical duty for scientists to advocate against neonatal surgeries without anesthesia. The parallels 213 
to our understanding of animal pain are obvious, and scientists could play an important role in 214 
advocating against farming or research practices that involve suffering in the form of pain as 215 
well. More generally, ethics makes a claim on scientists to engage with public debates on ethical 216 
issues that are related to their scientific activities (and sometimes even raised by their results) 217 
(Pain, 2013; Siekevitz, 1970). At a time when researchers in science and technology are often 218 
consulted to set the direction and values of society, and often occupy leadership roles on 219 
decision-making bodies, this obligation must increasingly be emphasized. For example, a 220 
communication from Mark S. Frankel, director of the Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights, 221 
and Law Program at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), argues 222 
that students and scientists should put less emphasis on their internal responsibility regarding 223 
how research should be conducted, and more on their external responsibility by being “vitally 224 
concerned” with the influence that their work and knowledge can have on society (Pain, 2013). 225 
Scientists are increasingly required to justify the benefits of their research to society—this is 226 
notably the case for individual applications to research positions or funding, as well as for 227 
research evaluations at the institutional level—and growing debates on animal moral status spark 228 
10 
 
public interest in animal behavior science. In this context, active engagement with animal ethics 229 
could translate to a new and promising applied dimension of scientists’ work—one that is both 230 
instrumentally beneficial and aligned with social responsibilities. 231 
 232 
Opening the “black box” of animal minds. Following the vast accumulation of knowledge on 233 
animal behavior, scientists are faced with new questions about the nature of animal minds, a 234 
crucial topic also at the center of philosophical debate today (Andrews, 2015; Andrews & Beck, 235 
2018; Lurz, 2009). Nonetheless, the lingering conviction that animal mental states are 236 
unknowable—a “black box” that is inaccessible to science—or irrelevant to the explanation of 237 
behavior (e.g., Dawkins, 2015) has limited scientifically-informed ethical reasoning about 238 
animals. For example, Griffin's (1998) call to bring the study of consciousness to the fore of 239 
ethology nearly two decades ago is continually met with considerable resistance (for a historical 240 
overview on cognitive ethology, see: Allen & Bekoff, 2007), and some contemporary scientists 241 
deny that documenting the degree of animal consciousness is useful in the science of 242 
comparative cognition (Shettleworth, 2010). In addition to this fundamental debate on whether 243 
animal consciousness can and should be studied by scientists, some major explanatory 244 
frameworks in animal behavior science have downplayed the explanatory significance of animal 245 
mental and emotional lives. In particular, behavioral ecologists are traditionally trained to focus 246 
on the adaptive value of a trait, favoring ultimate over proximate explanations for behavior. As 247 
one example, infanticide is often framed exclusively in terms of evolutionary costs/benefits, 248 
rather than any underlying emotion or proximate motivation (e.g., see van Schaik & Janson, 249 
2009). Although these functional evolutionary explanations are valuable in their own right, they 250 
offer only a very limited view of animal emotions, capabilities, and agency, and little to no 251 
insight into perceptions, intentionality, rationality, or consciousness residing “inside” of animal 252 
minds. This poses a deeper, more fundamental epistemological problem in the sense that 253 
building a whole field of scientific inquiry around what is currently a “black box” inherently 254 
hampers ultimate explanatory and predictive efforts. This shortcoming in turn reveals how 255 
explanatory frameworks in the behavioral sciences can quickly overlook or render invisible the 256 
very “object” of moral concern—the organism itself as a potentially sentient entity that can be 257 
benefited or harmed—or, at the very least, relegate the organism to secondary status (Walsh, 258 
2015).  259 
11 
 
The language that animal behavior scientists habitually employ reflects this deeply 260 
entrenched practice (Crist, 1999). Reducing animal behavior to mechanistic, causal descriptions 261 
has reinforced the view of animals as “mere” objects or “vehicles” of their genes and 262 
environment, preempting any inferences to their mental life or agency (it is noteworthy that in 263 
the writings of early naturalists such as Darwin, animals were commonly portrayed as 264 
individuals with an array of meaningful subjective experiences and aims). For example, scientists 265 
have traditionally used terms such as “innate releasing mechanism” while habitually relegating 266 
complex behavioral phenomena—usually those linked with cognitive or affective capacities—to 267 
more “parsimonious” explanations, further distancing themselves from the animals they study. 268 
However, this presupposes that such technical, parsimonious descriptions are also unbiased, and 269 
it would behoove scientists to realize that the theoretical language they employ is built on an 270 
inherently skeptical bias towards animal subjective and agential traits. The animal ethics 271 
literature, which puts animal subjectivity and agency at the heart of its argumentation, places an 272 
ethical urgency and burden of proof on mechanistic views of animal behavior in the behavioral 273 
sciences to show that animals are not sentient (Birch, 2017, 2018), and to develop more solid 274 
inferences about the existence and character of animal subjectivity (e.g., see Godfrey-Smith, 275 
2016; Smuts, 2001).  276 
 277 
Questioning the anthropocentric legacy of behavioral studies. The slow development of 278 
cognitive ethology is not merely a consequence of empirical limitations in accessing animal 279 
minds or a predominant focus on ultimate explanation in studies of animal behavior. The 280 
avoidance of attributing—or even studying—morally-relevant traits like agency, interests, or 281 
motivations and goals to non-human animals reflects a more pervasive bias, namely the 282 
perceived dangers of anthropomorphism (e.g., Wynne, 2004). In addition to shaping research 283 
questions, experimental settings and interpretations of results traditionally tend to disfavor 284 
anthropomorphic hypotheses, according to which similar mechanisms underlie the behavioral 285 
similarities observed between humans and non-humans. This occurs even when studying species 286 
that are closely related to us, a revelatory context regarding such a bias, referred to as 287 
“anthropodenial” by de Waal (1999). According to basic evolutionary principles, the most 288 
parsimonious explanation in such cases is the one assuming that similar processes in closely 289 
related species emerge from common ancestry (“phylogenetic parsimony”). A scenario in which 290 
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the evolution of distinct cognitive processes generates similar behavioral manifestations in 291 
closely related species is, in fact, improbable. It is also revealing to note that simple mechanistic 292 
explanations are generally favored over phylogenetic parsimony when discussing cognitive 293 
capacities, as opposed to physiological or anatomical traits, for which scientists have no problem 294 
invoking human-animal similarity (de Waal, 1999). This bias appears to be a direct, pervasive 295 
legacy of the famous Morgan’s Canon proposed at the end of the 19th century, which states that: 296 
‘In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical 297 
faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the 298 
psychological scale’ (Morgan, 1894, p. 53). A large philosophical literature has recently 299 
accumulated around related methodological issues (Buckner, 2017; Fitzpatrick, 2008; Halina, 300 
2015; Keeley, 2004; Mikhalevich, 2014; Sober, 2012), and scientists can benefit from deeper 301 
reflection on any bias toward simplicity that is motivated by worries about the dangers of 302 
anthropomorphism.  303 
Another upshot of this approach is that the threshold of evidence needed to provide 304 
support for a particular cognitive or emotional faculty in other species is much higher than in our 305 
own. For example, the definition of animal teaching initially proposed by Caro and Hauser 306 
(1992) has proven so strict that it would exclude many occurrences of human teaching as 307 
employed in common parlance (Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). This anthropocentric perspective has 308 
also figured prominently in debates about animal emotions (Bekoff, 2009; de Waal, 2019); it is 309 
not just a remnant of the behaviorist era but still alive today in the form of categorical rejections 310 
of anthropomorphism and anecdote. However, when the animal’s perspective is carefully 311 
considered, anthropomorphic and anecdotal accounts have an important role to play in informing 312 
and inspiring rigorous science (Bates & Byrne, 2007; Burghardt, 1991; de Waal, 1999; Godfrey-313 
Smith, 2016), particularly when it comes to animal mental capacities and emotions (Bekoff, 314 
2009). While this form of anthropocentric reductionism is very entrenched in the Western 315 
scientific culture in animal behavior, an independent academic tradition emerged in Japan, where 316 
anecdotes were valued, and where anthropomorphism was not considered a threat (Asquith, 317 
1996; de Waal, 2003). Despite intense criticisms by Western scientists, Japanese primatologists 318 
used individually-based observations—which are now the standard in ethological studies—and 319 
made fundamental discoveries in socio-ecology, such as the existence of tight family bonds 320 
structuring animal societies, and the diffusion of socially-learnt behaviors throughout animal 321 
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groups, long before these questions crystallized interest in Western research (Asquith, 1996; de 322 
Waal, 2003). This example illustrates the potential benefits of raising scientists’ awareness of the 323 
cultural and cognitive biases that may hamper progress in their discipline. And even though the 324 
fear of anthropomorphism may be less present in today’s scientific culture than it used to be, the 325 
critical stance adopted by thinkers in animal ethics regarding anthropocentric values, combined 326 
with their fresh and attentive eye towards animal minds and subjectivity, encourages behavioral 327 
scientists who have not already done so to inspect the deeply entrenched sources of biases that 328 
inevitably affect their discipline.  329 
 330 
Enriching scientific practices. A greater consideration of animal interests and subjectivity may 331 
be beneficial pragmatically by changing the way scientists ask questions, design protocols, and 332 
interpret animal reactions to experimental conditions. Integrating information about the first-333 
person perspective of the animal is increasingly recognized as important in evolutionary 334 
modelling of the effects of natural selection on behavior (e.g., Akçay, Van Cleve, Feldman, & 335 
Roughgarden, 2009). When designing experiments, careful attention to the animal’s perspective 336 
on a proposed task can reduce some biases—such as experimenter effects (Despret, 2015). For 337 
example, laboratory mice perceive gender of the experimenter and may consequently modify 338 
their behavioral response in an experiment, with male experimenters eliciting a greater stress 339 
response than females (Sorge et al., 2014). Along similar lines, earlier scholars appreciated that 340 
animals live in meaningful and complex worlds, and that adopting the animal’s sensory 341 
perspective was a necessary precondition for the successful study of behavior (von Uexküll, 342 
1992/1957). In contrast, subsequent behavioral studies have sometimes failed to adopt such a 343 
perspective by designing studies linked to species-specific daily environmental challenges, and 344 
so are at risk of making erroneous inferences about animal capacities. For example, dogs were 345 
once thought to lack self-awareness due to their failure to pass the mirror self-recognition task, 346 
which is strongly biased towards visual species, but they were subsequently found to succeed in 347 
passing an “olfactory mirror” test (e.g., Gatti, 2016). The role of perspective-taking in animal 348 
behavior research is also central to the influential work of philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1998), 349 
who first established a link between animal behavior and phenomenology—which can arguably 350 
make a major contribution to both animal ethics (Painter & Lotz, 2007) and scientific research on 351 
animal behavior (Ruonakoski, 2007) by offering additional insights into animal subjectivity. 352 
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When it comes to studying animal behavior, Merleau-Ponty (1998) questions the behaviorist way 353 
of interpreting the scientist’s role, requiring the scientist’s detachment from the study subject. 354 
Rather than rejecting anthropomorphism and denying their own sensitivity towards the behavior 355 
of study subjects, scientists could acknowledge that human experience, careful observation, and 356 
even engaged interaction with animals are the only possible starting points for their 357 
investigations, because absolute detachment is impossible in practice (e.g., see Candea, 2010; 358 
Ruonakoski, 2007; Smuts, 2001). 359 
An interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophers, ethicists, and scientists may promote 360 
changes in paradigms that could usefully complement traditional approaches and open 361 
productive, more holistic avenues to study and understand animal behavior without 362 
compromising scientific rigor. In particular, research in cognitive ethology on concepts rooted in 363 
classical, anthropocentric philosophy (e.g., self-awareness, empathy, free will, or culture) would 364 
benefit from such discussions, which may facilitate the establishment of more inclusive 365 
definitions (i.e., applicable to studying non-human animals) that retain theoretical and empirical 366 
traction. It would further encourage reflection on the most efficient research approaches and the 367 
criteria that would provide supporting evidence for the existence of such phenomena in other 368 
species. As one example, some philosophers reexamined the state of knowledge regarding 369 
behaviors long thought to be human-unique, such as the capacity to commit suicide (e.g., Peña-370 
Guzmán, 2017), by lending more weight to animal subjectivity than many scientists traditionally 371 
have. These exercises illustrate the potential power of such interdisciplinary dialogues for 372 
enriching the perspectives of scientists working on animal behavior, while making them more 373 
aware of the fact that a collection of scientific observations can lead to divergent interpretative 374 
frameworks.   375 
In sum, interactions between the science of animal behavior and animal ethics could have 376 
a greater and mutually beneficial scope, addressing questions about what animals are, how we 377 
should treat them, and how to envision potential futures for human-animal interactions. The 378 
possibility of such a productive exchange between science and philosophy has a strong precedent 379 
in the relationship between the science of ecology and environmental philosophy. By generating 380 
new scientific knowledge on the interconnectedness and dependence amongst various forms of 381 
life, the field of ecology has also influenced ethical thought. Though not uniformly defended by 382 
ethicists, ecology has led to calls to regard supra-individual processes, such as ecosystems 383 
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themselves, as intrinsically valuable and as objects of ethical concern—particularly concerning 384 
planetary health criteria grounded in the capacity to sustain and generate biodiversity. Just as in 385 
the case of animal behavior science and animal ethics, ecology too has been a source for 386 
combating anthropocentrism and generating a more balanced, indeed scientifically informed, 387 
worldview regarding the place of humans as one species embedded within deeply 388 
interconnected, interdependent living systems (Callicott, 1990).   389 
 390 
How can animal behavior scientists engage with philosophy and animal ethics?  391 
In turn, animal behavior scientists can contribute to animal ethics in various ways. Their 392 
potential contributions to animal ethics span the full spectrum of scientific activities—not only in 393 
offering original evidence that fuels theoretical progress in animal ethics, but shaping its 394 
practical applications, lending pertinent expertise, and communicating effectively with the wider 395 
public. There are, however, boundary conditions to what they can offer to ethicists; one 396 
prerequisite is that some research involving animals is tolerated—itself a source of disagreement 397 
even within the animal ethics community—provided that its costs are minimal and outweighed 398 
by clear benefits. As a result, behavioral scientists should carefully take ethical considerations 399 
into account when designing their research (Text Box 1).  400 
Foster productive interdisciplinary exchanges. An essential first step in this integration could be 401 
for behavioral scientists to familiarize themselves with the field of animal ethics (Armstrong & 402 
Botzler, 2017 provide a comprehensive anthology of readings on animal ethics), which will also 403 
cultivate mutual respect and awareness across fields. However, at least to our knowledge, animal 404 
ethics, and philosophy more generally, are often absent from animal behavior educational 405 
programs and curricula. Reciprocally, academic departments in animal studies are typically 406 
housed in social science or humanities faculties, and often lack scientists. This structural 407 
separation limits cross-disciplinary exchanges, which could be encouraged by the development 408 
of joint teaching, reading groups, research programs, and conferences. Mutual engagement and 409 
integrative theory-building could be further fostered by hosting philosophers and ethicists in 410 
scientific labs and research groups.  Further, several interdisciplinary journals now provide a 411 
forum wherein scholars across these disparate fields can comment on topics of mutual interest 412 
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ranging from animal emotions to the most sound approaches to animal protection legislation 413 
(e.g., see Birch, 2017 along with associated commentaries).  414 
Upon gaining meaningful exposure to the basic purview of animal ethics, scientists of 415 
animal behavior can further update some of their conceptual frameworks and research practices 416 
(as elaborated in the previous section), which may simultaneously foster the endorsement of their 417 
findings by non-scientists pursuing related questions. Among the most notable successes in this 418 
regard is pioneering work in the area of compassionate conservation, which attempts to appease 419 
tensions between scientists who conventionally focus on species and populations and ethicists 420 
who typically focus on individuals (Ramp & Bekoff, 2015).  421 
 422 
Produce relevant original evidence. As highlighted above, original evidence stemming from the 423 
natural course of animal behavior science has already played a role in inspiring important 424 
developments in animal philosophy. Of course, while detailed knowledge concerning the 425 
cognitive, affective, and social lives of animals can contribute to our understanding of what is 426 
“painful” to an animal, its degree of sentience and consciousness, the optimal environments in 427 
which it thrives, etc., it certainly cannot tell us what is right or wrong—the central concepts that 428 
structure ethical theory and practice. Nevertheless, biological knowledge on the natural behavior 429 
of different species, in relation to their phylogenetic position and ecology, can help in setting 430 
species-specific criteria for animal ethics agendas. It also has a hand in proposing modes of 431 
interactions with animals that are respectful of their physiology and psychology, consistent with 432 
a new theory of animal rights that borrows concepts from political philosophy (including 433 
citizenship or sovereignty) to envision a new legal frame applicable to the complexity and 434 
diversity of animal-human relationships (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011).  435 
In addition, as has already occurred in conservation practice, there is growing pressure 436 
for policy decisions concerning animal ethics to be evidence-based, and animal behavior 437 
scientists are positioned to contribute data and knowledge that can, at a minimum, inform 438 
political decisions regarding the assignment of diverse taxonomic groupings to particular moral 439 
categories (Jones, 2013). The diversity of species that animal behavior scientists study—many of 440 
which are beneath the radar of philosophers in favor of a focus on higher vertebrates (with 441 
notable exceptions, e.g.,Godfrey-Smith, 2016; Tye, 2016)—can raise new ethical concerns and 442 
priorities. For example, combined with novel insights on behavioral and cognitive complexity, 443 
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accumulating scientific evidence that fish feel pain has supported the argument that they be 444 
granted similar legal protections to other vertebrates (Brown, 2015). Similarly, legal personhood 445 
campaigns, generally devised to grant legal protections to large mammals, are contingent on 446 
evidence concerning capacities like self-awareness and autonomy (Andrews et al., 2018; Wise, 447 
2000). Thompson (2019) recently outlined how scientists’ work could better position lawyers to 448 
build personhood cases, citing four domains—innovativeness, altruism, self-control, and 449 
defiance—that would more demonstrably provide evidence for autonomy to the court system. 450 
Despite philosophical disagreement over the personhood defense of animal rights (e.g., see 451 
Korsgaard, 2018; Nussbaum, 2018), such communications are important given that scientists do 452 
not naturally design their research in light of legal principles and questions.  453 
The need for evidence-based animal ethics frameworks is not to overlook the veritable 454 
limits of scientific knowledge. It is important to note that the pace and reach of scientific 455 
progress is not always compatible with more immediate ethical decisions, necessitating guidance 456 
on what to do in the absence of convincing scientific evidence for aspects of animal sentience 457 
(e.g., see Birch, 2017). Further, burden of proof frameworks must weigh the relative 458 
consequences of under- versus over-attributing particular mental states to animals, as such 459 
estimations can immediately impact welfare and related policy decisions—in particular, the 460 
implications of our systematic use of skepticism as the default position should be carefully 461 
evaluated (Birch, 2017, 2018). It is also important to acknowledge the diversity of ethical stances 462 
towards the weight of scientific evidence—not merely in terms of what is accepted/tolerated, but 463 
what is encouraged as the optimal way to understand the complexity of the world around us. 464 
There are important philosophical discussions about the sources of our judgment as to whether or 465 
not animals have minds and mental lives, with some defending non-inferential approaches based 466 
on direct experience (see Jamieson, 2012; see also Bekoff, 2009 for an interesting discussion of 467 
scientific vs. common-sense approaches, which are likely best considered in tandem when it 468 
comes to animal ethics).  469 
Regardless of one’s position here, many scientists in the field of animal behavior spend 470 
considerable time observing animals, and thus have a wealth of direct “real world” experiences 471 
in this regard. A deep understanding of evolutionary theory, allied with the intimate experiences 472 
that people who work extensively with animals have, can translate to a unique perspective on 473 
animals and human-animal relationships that ethical debate should capitalize on (see Godfrey-474 
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Smith, 2016; Smuts, 2001 for pertinent examples). Phenomenologists are particularly interested 475 
in such perspectives given their potential to elucidate new realms of being and experience, 476 
challenging traditional philosophical views on animal natures and intersubjectivity (Merleau-477 
Ponty, 1998). 478 
 479 
Provide scientific expertise. Scientists’ ability to synthesize and scrutinize academic knowledge 480 
has the potential to further guide the public and policymakers in their interpretation of scientific 481 
evidence. For example, The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., 2012)—482 
prompted by the accumulation of data revealing that humans are not unique in possessing the 483 
neurological substrates that generate consciousness—was written by a group of neuroscientists to 484 
challenge previously held standards. Animal behavior scientists could similarly consider 485 
synthesizing information about species’ intellectual, emotional, and social lives in a format that 486 
can be used by decision-makers when drafting and/or updating ethics policies and legislation, 487 
preferably through quantitative meta-analyses and systematic reviews. Conservation and animal 488 
behavior scientists recently convened to identify research priorities in animal behavior that 489 
promote progress in applied conservation (Greggor et al., 2016); a similar exercise could benefit 490 
the translation of animal ethics into practical actions. Court cases on animal legal personhood are 491 
arising in a growing number of countries, providing a new context where animal behavior 492 
scientists may be expected to act as experts. However, unlike scientists who regularly intervene 493 
in court cases and are well aware of the legal culture, such as criminologists or psychiatrists, 494 
animal behavioral scientists are generally unprepared for such an exercise. At a smaller scale 495 
(and if not already the case), behavioral scientists can join ethics committees to ensure 496 
independent representation of animal interests in other scientific fields, and ascertain that ethical 497 
concerns are carefully weighed when reviewing articles and grant applications in their own field.  498 
 499 
Add a scientific credit to animal ethics in outreach efforts. Finally, scientists are often perceived 500 
as the authorities on animal behavior, and therefore have the opportunity to inform and engage 501 
the public about animal interests. Yet while it is commonplace for animal behavior scientists to 502 
emphasize the conservation implications of their work, other broader impacts related to the moral 503 
standing of animals are emphasized relatively less in their public outreach. Increasingly, research 504 
on animal behavior has mass public appeal, which opens the door for animal behavior scientists 505 
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to more actively engage with contemporary animal ethical or philosophical debates and 506 
discussions—following the recent tracks of some behavioral scientists (Balcombe, 2006; Bekoff, 507 
2009; Brown, 2015; Smuts, 2001). 508 
 509 
Concluding remarks 510 
Animal behavioral scientists have much to gain from their academic community’s engagement 511 
with animal ethics. By jumping into the discussion, scientists also engage more directly with a 512 
revolution that has been in part stimulated by their work. Given the rapid rise and foreseeable 513 
progress of debates around animal ethics, it is certain that the current generation of animal 514 
behavior scientists will have to confront the questions that it raises in the coming decade(s), both 515 
as scientists and as citizens. Developing a stronger, more informed and engaged stance that aims 516 
to build consensus surrounding questions raised in animal ethics becomes critical to ensure the 517 
long-term importance and contribution of their scientific field, to fulfill their moral obligations, 518 
and to meet societal expectations by taking part in debates that they are well-positioned to 519 
inform. We hope that this paper will encourage this pressing and overdue discussion. 520 
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Figure 1. Web-based search results (grey bars correspond to total number of hits) for the search terms (a) “animal ethics” as well as 
(b) “human-animal relations” in academic articles, and (c) “animal rights” in U.S. state/federal case law. The ratio of the total number 
of hits for each search term to the total number of hits for the (control) search term “animal” during the same decade is illustrated by 
black lines (see secondary Y-axis) to account for growth in scientific knowledge over time. All information was obtained from Google 
Scholar on May 17, 2019.
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Text Box 1: The ethics of using animals in behavioral science  
In this paper, we emphasize potential interactions between the philosophical field of animal 
ethics and behavioral sciences. Ethical issues raised by research in behavioral sciences are a 
related, though different and narrower issue. On top of legal requirements, professional 
organizations have taken further practical steps to ensure that ethical issues related to animal 
welfare are an integral part of the design of the research being conducted by setting up their own 
standards (see the Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour's (2012) guidelines and the 
Guidelines for Ethical Conduct in the Care and Use of Nonhuman Animals in Research by the 
American Psychological Association (2010)). The main scientific journals in psychology and 
behavioral ecology require that these standards be met to publish a paper. It certainly does not 
mean that all ethical issues associated with animal behavior sciences have been thoroughly 
resolved, and future work should strive to keep ethics questions central to its interests. Empirical 
work attempting to measure the stress, pain, and mortality caused by study protocols is an 
emerging field of research (e.g., Hämäläinen, Heistermann, Fenosoa, & Kraus, 2014; Le Maho et 
al., 2011), and several recent reviews have been dedicated to these and other ethical issues 
(Costello et al., 2016; Field et al., 2019; Mackinnon & Riley, 2010). 
